The Problems of Philosophy (Annotated), by Bertrand Russell
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The Problems of Philosophy (Annotated), by Bertrand Russell
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The Problems of Philosophy (1912) is one of Bertrand Russell's attempts to create a brief and accessible guide to the problems of philosophy. Focusing on problems he believes will provoke positive and constructive discussion, Russell concentrates on knowledge rather than metaphysics: If it is uncertain that external objects exist, how can we then have knowledge of them but by probability. There is no reason to doubt the existence of external objects simply because of sense data.Russell guides the reader through his famous 1910 distinction between "knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description" and introduces important theories of Plato, Aristotle, René Descartes, David Hume, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel and others to lay the foundation for philosophical inquiry by general readers and scholars alike.“ In the following pages I have confined myself in the main to those problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say something positive and constructive, since merely negative criticism seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some topics much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all.”Includesa biography of the Author
The Problems of Philosophy (Annotated), by Bertrand Russell- Amazon Sales Rank: #816433 in eBooks
- Published on: 2011-11-14
- Released on: 2011-11-14
- Format: Kindle eBook
About the Author Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was born in England and educated at Trinity College, Cambridge. His long career established him as one of the most influential philosophers, mathematicians, and social reformers of the twentieth century.
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0 of 0 people found the following review helpful. STILL ONE OF THE BEST "INTRODUCTIONS" TO PHILOSOPHY AVAILABLE By Steven H Propp Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872-1970) was an influential British philosopher, logician, mathematician, and political activist. In 1950, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature, in recognition of his many books such as A History of Western Philosophy, The Problems of Philosophy, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, The Analysis of Mind, Our Knowledge of the External World, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, Mysticism and Logic, etc.He wrote in the Preface to this 1910 book, "In the following pages, I have confined myself in the main to those problems of philosophy in regard to which I thought it possible to say something positive and constructive, since merely negative criticism seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a larger space than metaphysics in the present volume, and some topics much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all." [NOTE: page numbers below refer to the 255-page hardcover edition.]He begins the first chapter by stating, "Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man would doubt it?... philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically, after exploring all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our ordinary ideas." (Pg. 9-10) He continues, "let us concentrate attention on the table... Although I believe that the table is `really' of the same color all over, the parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other parts... if several people are looking at the table ... no two of them will see exactly the same... Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy---the distinction between `appearance' and `reality,' between what things seem to be and what they are... [the philosopher] is more troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the question." (Pg. 11-13)He concludes, "Thus our familiar table... has become a problem of surprising possibilities. The one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems... Among these surprising possibilities, doubt suggests that perhaps there is no table at all. Philosophy, if it cannot ANSWER so many questions as we could wish, has at least the power of ASKING questions which ... show the strangeness and wonder lying just below the surface even in the commonest things of daily life." (Pg. 24-25)He notes, "It is of course POSSIBLE that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt. But we cannot have REASON to reject a belief except on the ground of some other belief. Hence... we can arrive... at an orderly systematic organization of our knowledge, in which, though the POSSIBILITY of error remains, its likelihood is diminished by the interrelation of the parts and by the critical scrutiny which has preceded acquiescence." (Ch. II, pg. 39-40)He states, "The fundamental principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions is this: Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted... This chief importance of knowledge by description is that it enables us to pass beyond the limits of our private experience." (Ch. V, pg. 91-92)He admits, "The ONLY reason for believing that the laws of motion will remain in operation is that they have operated hitherto, so far as our knowledge of the past enables us to judge... But the real question is: Do ANY number of cases of a law being fulfilled in the past afford evidence that it will be fulfilled in the future? If not... we have no ground whatever for expecting the sun to rise tomorrow... all such expectations are only PROBABLE; thus we have not to seek for a proof that they MUST be fulfilled, but only for some reason in favor of the view that they are LIKELY to be fulfilled." (Ch. 6, pg. 96)He acknowledges, "The fact... that things often fail to fulfill our expectations is no evidence that our expectations will not PROBABLY be fulfilled in a given case or a given class of cases. Thus our inductive principle is ... not capable of being DISPROVED by an appeal to experience. The inductive principle, however, is equally incapable of being PROVED by an appeal to experience... All such general principles are believed because mankind have found innumerable instances of their truth, and no instances of their falsehood. But this affords no evidence for their truth in the future, unless t. he inductive principle is assumed." (Ch. VI, pg. 105-107)He asserts, "Perhaps the most important example of non-logical a priori knowledge is knowledge as to ethical value... I am speaking of judgments as to the intrinsic desirability of things... all judgments as to what is useful depend upon judgments as to what has value on its own account. We judge, for example, that happiness is more desirable than misery, knowledge than ignorance, goodwill than hatred, and so on. Such judgments must, in part at least, be immediate and a priori... they may be ELICITED by experience... But it is fairly obvious that they cannot be PROVED by experience... In the present connection, it is only important to realize that knowledge as to what is intrinsically of value is a priori, namely in the sense that the truth of such knowledge can neither be proved nor disproved by experience." (Ch. VII, pg. 118-119)He observes, "We have first to distinguish between knowledge of things and knowledge of truths... Our derivative knowledge of things, which we call knowledge by DESCRIPTION, always involves both acquaintance with something and knowledge of truths. Our immediate knowledge of truths may be called INTUITIVE knowledge, and the truths so known may be called SELF-EVIDENT truths... If the above account is correct, all our knowledge of truths depends upon our intuitive knowledge." (Ch. X, pg. 171-172)He points out, "if the law of contradiction itself were subjected to the test of coherence, we should find that, if we choose to suppose it to be false, nothing will any longer be incoherent with anything else. Thus the laws of logic supply the skeleton or framework within which the test of coherence applies, and they themselves cannot be established by this test... [Therefore] coherence cannot be accepted as giving the MEANING of truth, though it is often a most important TEST of truth... Hence we are driven back to correspondence with fact as constituting the nature of truth..." (Ch. XII, pg. 192-193) Later, he adds, "It will be seen that minds do not CREATE truth or falsehood. They create beliefs, but when once the beliefs are created, the mind cannot make them true or false, except in the special case where they concern future things which are within the power of the person believing... What makes a belief true is a FACT, and this fact does not...in any way involve the mind of the person who has the belief." (Ch. XII, pg. 202-203)He summarizes, "if we assume that intuitive knowledge is trustworthy in proportion to the degree of its self-evidence, there will be a gradation in trustworthiness... What we firmly believe, if it is true, is called KNOWLEDGE, provided it is either intuitive or inferred... from intuitive knowledge from which it follows logically. What we firmly believe, if it is not true, is called ERROR. What we firmly believe, if it is neither knowledge nor error, and also what we believe hesitatingly... may be called PROBABLE OPINION. Thus the greater part of what would commonly pass as knowledge is more of less probable opinion. In regard to probable opinion, we can derive great assistance from COHERENCE, which we rejected as the definition of truth, but may often use as a CRITERION. A body of individually probable opinions, if they are mutually coherent, become more probable than any one of them would be individually." (Ch. XIII, pg. 217-218)He concludes, "The true philosophic contemplation... finds its satisfaction in every enlargement of the no-Self, in everything that magnifies the objects contemplated, and thereby the subject contemplating... The free intellect will see as God might see... knowledge as impersonal, as purely contemplative, as it is possible for man to attain. Hence also the free intellect will value more the abstract and universal knowledge into which the accidents of private history do not enter... The impartiality which, in contemplation, is the unalloyed desire for truth, is the very same quality of mind which, in action, is justice, and in emotion is that universal love which can be given to all... Thus contemplation ... makes us citizens of the universe, not only of one walled city at war with all the rest. In this citizenship of the universe consists man's true freedom, and his liberation from the thralldom of narrow hopes and fears... Philosophy is to be studied... for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination, and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation; but above all because... the mind also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the universe which constitutes its highest good." (Ch. XV, pg. 247-250)Although this book is more than 100 years old, its arguments and analysis still seem quite "fresh"; and Russell's writing is, as always, clear and pertinent. This book will reward nearly ALL readers, regardless of their level of philosophical background and interest.
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